Latin-American Studies

    In 1959, on the 26th of July, Fidel Castro led a unified and armed revolt to overthrow the current dictator of Cuba, Fulgencio Batista, and end the Batista reign of terror and corruption.  For many years prior to his moment of victory, however, Castro proved highly influential in aiding the corruption of the Batista reign by utilizing his control over the crime operations of mobsters from the United States to insinuate revolutionary ideals into the minds of the Cuban people and secure his future as new dictator of Cuba. 

In fact, Castro did more than aid the degeneration of the Batista reign he might have been the mastermind behind the entire ring of corruption to control and extort the perspectives of the Cuban people and bring about a significant revolt that would literally hand him the reins of dictatorship.  With that said, a close look will be taken into the years leading up to the Cuban Revolution to define the role of the mobsters from the United States and their part in the corruption of the Batista reign, ending with an analytical look into how Fidel Castro formed his revolutionary ideals and brought about his cleverly instituted rise to dictatorship by using the United States mob and their activities in Cuba as his personal weapon of corruption.

    To begin with, the United States has always played a large role in the commerce, business, and even internal affairs of Cuba.  In fact, it was a state whose independence from Spain in 1898 had, in effect, been secured for it by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American war. As such, Cubas freedom of action had been limited for thirty years (1902-1934) under the Platt Amendment, which enabled the United States to intervene legally in the islands internal affairs under certain circumstances.  This legal intervention allowed mobsters and upper-level members of the mafia to come into leadership positions and begin securing a foundation within the seedy underbelly of Cuba.  As their foundation grew, so too did their control and influence over prominent and high-ranking people like the Batista family.

Despite the fact that in the generation since 1933, the countrys industries and services had been increasingly Cubanized by local entrepreneurs, much of the aura of the old days still hung about United States  Cuban relations in the 1950s. This long, ambiguous association with North America led Cuban nationalism to be defined, perforce, as anti-Americanism.  Too, this created an easy opening for men of wisdom like Fidel Castro and his guerilla associates, who saw the rising urgency for change as the perfect opportunity to reinforce that animosity and channel it into directions that would later aid in his end-game mission to overthrow Fulgencio Batista and take control of the dictatorship. 

But what could have prompted Fidel Castros mission to destroy the Batista dictatorship  In essence, the Batista regime of 1952-58 was bad but not wholly evil.  It did continue to encourage the diversification of agriculture which most people recognized then as a desirable venture for Cuba if the economy were to prosper in freedom.  And it was.  Cuba did experience economic and agriculture prosperity, at least in comparison to years past. 

However, Batista himself, though retaining much of his personal charm of manner for occasional visitors, had become very lazy and procrastinatory at a time when Cubamuch richer than it had been in the 1930swas a country much more difficult to govern.  Prosperity brought powerful people to the forefront of Cubas internal affairs.  Men, especially mafia members from the United States, found themselves in powerful positionspositions in which they could exert their control over various financial (or crime based) operations.   

There is a good tale is told by one of Batistas old generals of how when communiqus were issued saying that Batista had spent the day conferring with his officers, he was in fact playing Canasta with them.  Nothing angers a people more than the news that their all-powerful leaders are supposed to be dealing with life altering matters of state and instead they are playing cards. 

It may not be significant of his leadership abilities, but every American remembers when the tragedy of 911 occurred and President George W. Bush received the news.  For  brief moment, he looked like he might be prompted to actionand then, without issuing orders or dealing with the situation, he remained in the classroom in which he was reading children stories and resumed reading as if nothing had occurred.  While some critics assuage this moment as a man who can maintain composure in a time of crisis, others see this as a political leader (in fact, the leader of the free world) who is unwilling to step up in a time when his country needs him.  In much the same way, Batista ignored issues of policy and state and chose to goof off with his buddies to pass the time.      

Even more, Batistas accumulation of a substantial fortune abroad made him more inclined to dream of retirement in the Canaries or perhaps in Portugal.  Only when the opposition began to take shape under Castro and his youngish associatessome of them merely students or even schoolboysdid Batista allow his police the free run which has made them infamous.  His army, divided by personal disputes among his officers, and ill-provided with weapons and supplies, was incapable of coping with a small insurrection whose directors from the start showed themselves masters of public relations both in Cuba and in the United States.  Where Batista made his mistake, and allowed a man as industrious as Fidel Castro to destroy him, was his lack of focus as a leader.  His mind was elsewhereplaying cards with his upper-rank friends, planning vast vacations and retirement in foreign lands, and allowing his crack team of untrained and vicious police to attempt to retain control. 

More than that, Batista demonstrated a penchant for activities provided by the United States mafiaprostitution, high-stakes gambling, and drugs.  However, the question of what to do about Batista did not really present itself as a serious one until the last quarter of 1958.  Until then the Eisenhower administration in the United States had not really taken anything in Cuba very seriously Secretary of State John Foster Dulles thought Latin America uninteresting and despite an earlier Marxist episode in Guatemala involving, among others, Ernesto Guevara, and despite the unpleasantries encountered particularly in Caracas by Vice-President Richard Nixon during his Latin America tour, this was entirely comprehensible.  And that was from the United States side of things.  It was clear to all that Batista had become a problem for more than just his country. 

On the other hand, Castro had only a few hundred armed followers he had captured no towns at all and the level of violence was modest the figure of 20,000 killed in the war against Batista cropped up only in 1959, after Castro was in Havana.  However, Castro didnt need to be that powerful of a force to take over Batistabecause Batista was not prepared for anything, let alone armed violence and people equipped with zealot-level opinions intending to destroy him.  

In many ways, however, Fidel Castros revolutionary action and literal creation of the Cuban Revolution was a bit too easy.  In truth, he didnt have a large number of revolutionaries, the fight itself didnt last long, and he immediately took the reins of Cubas dictatorship, hardly moments after Batista had fallen.  How, then, was he able to secure such a victory  In essence, Castro used Batistas greatest weaknesshis penchant for gambling, drugs, and prostitution provided by the United States mafiaand elevated Batista as a man who must be destroyed before he destroyed their beloved Cuba.
To start with, tourism, like Cubas other trade items, depended on the economic health of the market place. The enterprise had generated profits and employment and, for a while, had shielded Havana from the most extreme financial repercussions of the islands reliance on agriculture.  Tourism had always been the financial barometer for the health of Cuba.  The more people who came to buy and gamble and in general enjoy what Cuba had to offer, the better Cuba was off financially.  And for many years, tourism was up and financial meters were in the black.   

However, the simple financial success was not indestructible. The islands foreign trade in 1933 was about one-quarter of what it had been in 1928.  The equivalent of more than 400 million in US currency circulated through the Cuban economy in 1926, but only 32 million greased the wheels of commerce in 1934.  People earned little money to pay for purchases.  Even more, a public works plan could not begin to soak up the ranks of the unemployed even government employees went unpaid.  Sugar workers salaries averaged eighty-three cents a day, and circumstances forced many workers to accept thirty cents if that was all the mill owner offered. 

In the years leading up to the Cuban Revolution, tourist sector employment languished too, as hotels and restaurants closed.  Tour bus and car services lost their passengers.  Cuban manufacturers of soap and sweets, perfume and paint, cement and crystal, souvenirs and straw hats felt the pinch as tourists disappeared.  Breweries and distilleries certainly felt the loss.  Business in cafs and bars deteriorated to such a degree that unemployed cabaret musicians strolled from place to place and performed for whatever the patrons were willing to give them.  It had become a sad and desperate time for the people of Cubaand they were just looking for someone to blame, or better yet, someone who could bring their country back to a state of financial wealth and stability. 

The people of Cuba became so distraught that a volcano of discontent spewed a terrain-altering seriousness across the pleasure-bent tourist landscape and it finally erupted.  Earnest reformers debated the social utility of tourism.  Did a successful industry require Cuba to cater to the base desires of the marketplace, or could tourism be used to uplift and educate, to achieve desirable cultural gains that is, could Cuba market tourism that elevated and enlightened as well as entertained  And this was in the late 1930slong before Fidel Castro became powerful enough to take this ideology of discontent and harness it for his own purposes.

And then Cuba took another hit.  Already subject to economic and political handicaps, the tourist industry reeled when reports connected the U.S. mobster Charles Lucky Luciano (Salvatore Lucania) with gambling activities at the Jockey Club and Casino Nacional, two critical centers of tourist activity.  Luciano, a veteran of the prostitution and bootlegging eras of U.S. organized criminal activities, had been sent to prison on drug trafficking charges in 1936 and was paroled and deported to his native Italy a decade later.  Luciano had grand plans of his own, and being deported did little to hamper his drug activity. 

Indeed, shortly after Lucianos departure, the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics noted an increase of Turkish heroin on the streets and traced its route through Italy.  When Luciano showed up in Havana late in 1946, U.S. narcotics agents consulted their files.  Accumulated information on his Cuban connections convinced them that he intended to establish Havana as a transfer point for the hugely profitable heroin trade into the United States.  And this is exactly what Luciano proceeded to accomplish.  Cuba became his own private drug ringand Fidel Castro watched with pleasure as powerful political leaders, including Batista, became embroiled in the drug ring and even protected Luciano from getting caught.

At one point, Luciano rented a home in suburban Miramar and met with old friends and colleagues from Havana and the United States during a six-month period while the U.S. unsuccessfully pressured Cuban officials to oust him.  Habaneros complained that the longtime Mafia boss enjoyed protection from high Cuban officials.  Even more, those complaints did not go unnoticed.  The interior minister refused to order Lucianos appearance for a hearing on illicit drug trafficking charges, most likely to avoid revealing the names of his Cuban associates.  He was a slippery catch for the U.S. Narcotics Bureau, who struggled both politically and with added pressure from the United States and Cuba.  Finally, deciding that the only way to win the war on drugs was to utilize them, the U.S. Narcotics Bureau threatened to cut off supplies of legitimate medical narcotics and the Cubans arrested Luciano and sent him back to Italy.